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DISARMAMENT
SLOGANS OR 
STRATEGIES
M ost d isarm am ent 
activists believe that 
Australia will remain In the 
nuclear firing line so long 
as there are foreign 
military installations on 
our territory. The problem 
Is how to remove those 
Installations. PHILIP HIND 
proposes a debate on 
strategy and offers his 
ideas.
P h ilip  Hind
Un ite d  S ta te s  bases have emerged as the major focus of the disarmament movement in Australia, at least among its more 
militant sections.
The bases are seen by many as the 
most concrete Australian expression 
of the more general threat of nuclear 
war — the closest thing we have to 
missiles in our own backyard. They 
also have quite demonstrable links 
with the "warfighting" arsenals and 
strategies of the nuclear powers. Last 
but not least, the removal of bases is 
seen by some as the most militant of 
the demands that an Australian 
movement can make.
The bases are not just a nuclear 
issue. Challenging the presence of the 
bases is also seen as a means for 
confronting head-on the forces of US 
militarism and reaction in Australia. 
Simultaneously, so the argument 
continues, this challenge will expose 
the inherent weakness of social- 
democratic solutions.
However, while this approach has 
great appeal to the left, it has failed 
thus far to answer the central political 
question which any movement must 
fa c e : h o w , in  th e  c o n c r e te  
c ircum stances of today, can a 
concrete strategy be devised capable 
of achieving its aims. More specifically, 
how can we break the deep ideological 
and cultural identification that the 
great mass of Australians have with the 
bases, ANZUS and the Western 
Alliance?
We need a thorough-going analysis 
of the political and social context in 
which the bases issue has to be put 
fo rw a rd . T he  p re s c r ip t io n  o f 
sloganised solutions is simple; the 
path to mass activity is complex and 
more qualified.
There are three premises which I 
take as fundamental for such an
analysis and for a real reckoning of 
where the movement must head:
•  Without mass popular support the 
bases cannot be removed either 
individually or collectively. Support for 
their removal at present does not exist 
in anywhere near the right measure, 
despite the relative strengths of the 
recent Australia-wide disarmament 
mobilisations. Hence we must look to 
the building of support through a 5-10 
year program, a minimum at best.
•  There will be many steps and 
stages along the way to reaching our 
objective . C learly , our u ltim ate  
objective is the removal of all nuclear- 
related bases from Australia. But a 
strategy based on existing, concrete 
re a litie s  and o rien te d  to w a rds  
generating ever higher levels of public 
support is essential. It is illusory to 
think — as is suggested by some 
people's blind faith — that a wave of 
mass protest will emerge which will 
drive the Americans into the sea, or 
force a government to order the bases 
shut overnight. If we fail to enunciate 
what intermediate steps must be taken, 
we will have no bearings by which to 
gauge the success of our campaigns or 
to help people face the difficulties we 
will unavoidable face.
•  The m ovem ent m ust f in d  its  
expression within the formal and 
parliamentary political arena, as well 
as beyond. While it is necessary to 
th e o ris e  and o rg an ise  fo r  the 
development of a mass movement as a 
broad and political independent 
phenomena, this is not sufficient. The 
movement must ultimately fight for 
changes and im p lem enta tion  of 
particular policies within govern­
ments. Alienation from, and hostility 
towards, this arena will likely find the 
movement frustrated at later stages. In 
particular, then, we must determine 
how the movement will be able to
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sustain the movement, we need to 
develop intermediate and achievable 
targets. We need to avoid creating an 
all or nothing situation — urgent and 
necessary though the removal of all 
bases is.
I have iden tified  fo u r possib le  intermediate steps, or what might b e tte r be ca lled  "ca m pa ig n  directions". All deserve far more 
detailed thought and debate within the 
movement than they have received so 
far. In some cases they have scarcely 
been considered at all; others have 
fared only slightly better. None may yet 
prove to be appropriate; still others
mignt be aaaea.
The building of greater support — 
beyond those who already accept 
opposition to bases as an article of 
faith — is essential. It requires an 
opening of horizons, and a challenge 
to old ideas, that are deep set within the 
Australian popular consciousness.
Here are some possible campaign 
directions:
•  A moratorium on the bases.
This simple concept is based on 
calling for an immediate halt to the 
upgrading or extension of existing 
bases and refusing the addition of any 
new bases.
Such a campaign would already 
have a very broad potential base for 
popular appeal. In terms of political 
parties, it could be palatable to wide 
sections of the ALP, the Democrats 
and could possibly win some Liberal 
supporters.
The concept has an immediacy and
simplicity about it without invoking all 
the "hard” issues ot ine American 
Alliance. Its links with the "freeze" 
movement in the US are obvious and 
could help break the anti-American 
bogey the movement is continually 
burdened with on the bases issue.
In itself, it would be a clear political 
statement by Australia indicating our 
opposition to any further escalation of 
the arms race.
•  A single-base focus.
In this case the movement nationally 
would focus on a single base and make 
that the frontline of attack and key 
mobilising point for the movement.
A focus of this sort could have two 
p urposes: (i) to  b rin g  spec ia l 
3  awareness and concern in popular 
^ c o n s c io u s n e s s  abou t a s ing le  
£. installation, and (ii) to pick on a base 
£ which seems to be the "weakest link". 
3 North West Cape is not the only 
possibility. But it does suggest itself, in 
ways that others do not, in terms of its 
overwhelming strategic importance 
and clear-cut connections with the 
arms race.
It is a prime communications base 
for nuclear submarines; a vehicle for 
first-strike strategy; a priority nuclear 
target; an installation that has strategic 
significance for the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans; and it plays a nuclear role 
which is relatively easy to explain.
North West Cape has already been 
acknowledged by the present Labor 
government as a problem requiring 
special measures to make it more 
acceptable. Statements of reservation 
and concern have been expressed by 
leading ALP spokespersons and some 
state branches. Reservation has 
sp ec ifica lly  centred around the 
possible "derogation of Australian 
sovereignty" associated with the base; 
specifically the fact that communic­
a tions invo lv ing  war a le rt and 
command could be signalled without 
Australia's knowledge (as occurred 
during the Yom Kippur War in 1973). 
Unfortunately, this real problem has 
been momentarily pushed aside with 
the Hawke government's somewhat 
amusing plan (now agreed to by the 
Americans) to place an Australian 
liaison officer in the Pentagon. I don't 
think anyone will be surprised if this 
poor soul isn't consulted prior to the 
start of WWIII!
On the more promising side, a recent 
statement by Senator Ryan said that a 
base like NW Cape could only be 
supported insofar as it serves to 
maintain "deterrence".
There are gaping holes in the 
publicly stated justification of NW 
C ape w h ic h  the  d is a rm a m e n t 
movement — if it exploits them 
carefully — ought to be able to drive a
influencea Labor government and now 
it will judge the actions of the same in 
the meantime.
S tarting from these premises, it is d ifficult to find common ground with those people who pose the debate about strategy in terms of 
unswerving adherence to the slogan: 
"US Bases Out". The slogan, in fact, 
becomes a substitute for a strategy. It 
poses (falsely) only one possible 
demand at any point in time: anything 
less  re p re s e n ts  a " s e l l - o u t " .  
Furthermore, the question of removing 
the bases can then be reduced (by the 
same adherents of this position) to
mere "mechanical" considerations 
whether violence or non-violent direct 
action is the best "method" by which 
people can be won over. In crude 
terms, the basic line of reasoning 
becomes: when enough arrests have 
occurred, enough heads have been 
batoned and enough agitation has 
taken place, the day of the big 
showdown will come. The slogan will 
become reality: US Bases Out!
At one level at least, there is no real 
argument in the movement: the 
removal of nuclear bases is the explicit 
objective of the greater part of the 
disarmament movement. The only 
substantive question (and difference) 
revolve around the question — how 
can the bases be removed?
A campaign to remove the bases will 
surely be a long one. It already has a 
twenty-year history — anotherten may 
be looking at things optimistically. To
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truck through. In terms of legitimation, 
(sjW Cape is the weakest link. The fact 
that its lease comes up for renewal in 
1989 gives such a campaign a specific 
| goal with a nice lead time.
| Such a campaign focus would not 
mean ignoring the other bases or 
allowing their respective roles to be 
played down. However, in determining 
political priorities and concentrating 
j energies, NW Cape could become the 
| sustained focus of the Australia-wide 
I movement.
• Internationalising the bases.
Several existing bases could, under 
different conditions, assist in the 
in te r n a t io n a l m o n ito r in g  and  
v e r if ic a tio n  o f d isa rm am en t. A 
campaign to place the surveillance and 
reconnaissance functions (of either or 
both Pine Gap or Nurrungar) under 
international control could have this as 
its aim.
For many years the prim ary 
argument advanced by the US to 
explain and justify these bases is their 
j  role in m on ito ring  the m ilita ry  
c a p a b ilit ie s , p repa redness and 
movements of Soviet forces. The 
Americans say they help "make 
deterrence work” . (The fact that they 
also enhance the first strike capability 
of the US is conveniently avoided.) 
Existing arms control treaties, like 
SALT I and the Partial Test Ban Treaty, 
are also partly served by information 
gathered from such systems.
However, the argument can be 
turned against those who advocate it. If 
the bases have functions which are 
essential to "n u c le a r s ta b ility " , 
verification and the monitoring of 
treaties or crises, why not place them 
under international control where all 
countries can benefit and judge the 
facts fo r them selves? If "d is " -  
armament based on international 
accep tance , ra th e r than  "a rm s 
control" based on superpowerdeals, is 
to become a reality, then won't such 
systems of monitoring and verification 
need to be available?
One proposal along these lines was 
put forward by the French to the First 
UN Special Session on Disarmament 
in 1978. Under the project name of the 
In te rna tiona l S a te llite  M on ito ring  
Agency (ISMA), the proposal has 
already been the subject of a United 
Nations report in which a team of 
international experts adjudged it to be 
both te ch n ica lly  and fin a n c ia lly  
feasible.
Fundamentally, the proposal still 
requires political support and it w ill be 
necessary for it to become the subject 
of real action. A progressive Australian 
governm ent, bent on advancing 
disarmament internationally, while 
loosening its own nuclear connection,
would be well placed to play an active 
part in just such a process. Indeed, 
whether the proposal became a reality 
or not, its serious debate in the 
Australian political context would 
serve to open wholly new ground for 
the movement. Several things could 
develop in the course of such a 
campaign:
(i) it would give an anti-bases 
campaign a very positive and active 
disarmament content and would also 
link us internationally to a solution to 
the arms race, rather than simply 
"opting out";
(ii) it would help pull the rug out from 
under the US in terms of their public 
leg itim a tion  fo r Pine Gap and 
Nurrungar. It would tend to force into 
public argument the "warfighting" 
capacity of these bases (as opposed to 
"war-deterring" roles); and behind that 
their CIA functions;
(iii) it would be a very useful counter to
those who accuse the movement of 
simply being anti-US and pro-Soviet.
The proposal is consistent with the 
need to find a "third way" to 
disarmament beyond the confines of 
superpower bargaining. It would also 
help overcome age-old arguments and 
negotiating deadlocks around the 
problem of "verification". In sum, a 
campaign designed to push for 
" in te rn a tio n a lis a tio n " of desired 
functions of the bases could make the 
tim e-w orn  ju s tif ic a tio n s  fo r our 
support of the American deterrent a 
popular source of concern and 
agitation within Australia.
•  C h a lle n g in g  the U S -A u s tra lia n  
Alliance
A campaign with very far-reaching 
implications would involve seeking a 
critical review of all the treaties 
covering US bases in Australia. 
Specifically, it could be a review 
oriented along two lines:
(i) demanding a non-nuclearcondition 
on the continued functioning of those 
bases, and
(ii) demanding Australian sovereignty 
over all their activities.
Such a campaign could emerge as a 
follow-on to already successful, or 
well-established, campaigns outlined 
as directions above.
A campaign to review the alliance 
might base itself initia lly around a 
demand fo ra  public inquiry or national 
debate in which the two conditions — 
non-nuclear functions and Australian 
sovereignty — become the terms of 
reference. Alternatively, one might 
envisage a scenario in which a 
progressive Labor government is 
encouraged to fight an election 
campaign based on a commitment to 
renegotiating ANZUS along these 
lines.
This would be a radically different 
exercise  than the "rev iew  and 
strengthening" of the ANZUS Treaty 
conducted by Prime Minister Hawke in 
Washington recently. It would reject 
the notion of "nuclear deterrence" and 
distance Australia from the Big Brother 
approach to questions of global and 
regional security.
The underlying basis of such a 
campaign's success would lie in its
a b ility  to tap the an ti-nuc lea r, 
n a t io n a lis t  and in d e p e n d e n c e  
aspirations of the Australian people. 
But it would need to do so without 
simultaneously feeding people's real 
fears about a "defenceless" Australia; 
or of the Soviet threat; or without 
throwing into question Australia's 
long-standing cultural and economic 
links with the West.
In the broader view of things, it may 
become apparent over time that it is 
only possible to launch such a 
campaign simultaneously with putting 
forward a strategy for an alternative 
and independent defence policy for 
Australia. If this were so, the peace 
movement will need to become part of 
an effort to build a "progressive 
consensus" in the community along 
these lines. In short, a campaign to 
remove the bases and to renegotiate 
Australia's role in the ANZUS alliance 
would also be a campaign for an 
independent Australian defence force 
and posture . (Such a defence 
capability could arguably be built 
along conventional lines around the 
concept of "Fortress Australia" and 
might also incorporate some elements 
of the more unconventional "social" 
defence approach.)
"It is illusory to think that a wave of mass protest will emerge 
which will drive the Americans into the sea, or force a 
government to order the bases shut overnight."
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M any people on the left and within the more militant sections of the disarmament 
movement are fervently pushing for 
the whole question of the alliance, and 
our unconditional withdrawal from it, 
to be placed high on the movement's 
agenda now. In one sense, this is 
nothing new: it has always been part 
and parcel of left programs and a 
recurring theme within the peace 
movement since World War II.
Despite the current growth of the 
disarmament movement, the gap 
between demands, programmatic 
exhortations and protest actions on 
the one hand, and the real attachments 
that the broad mass of Australian 
people feel towards our nuclear Big 
Brother, on the other, is yet to be 
seriously bridged.
To fin d  a way ou t o f th is  
contradictory reality demands fresh 
thinking about some well-established 
principles. The movement needs to 
assert certain fundamentals which can 
readily gain wide support, without 
being side-tracked into a blind anti- 
Americanism or taking on board more 
id e o lo g ic a l  b a g g a g e  th a n  is 
appropriate to the circumstances.
I would suggest the fundamentals 
which are capable of winning mass 
support and breaking down the
Big Brother syndrome include the 
following:
(i) opposition to the nuclear arms race
— Australia's express desire not to 
contribute to its further escalation and 
our commitment to its reversal;
(ii) our sovereign right to determine 
when, whether and how war is made on 
our soil;
(iii) our belief that the ANZUS Treaty of 
1951 carried within it no necessary 
compulsion for Australia to accept a 
nuclear servicing role "in exchange” 
for our defence; and
(iv) a belief that the dangers associated 
with the presence of US bases on our 
soil are inconsistent with our real 
defence needs and threaten the 
livelihood of all Australians.
Against this sort of background, 
there could be some real thinking 
a bo u t s tra te g ic  d ire c t io n s  and 
concrete actions for the movement. 
Without it we remain confined within 
the  a n tin o m y  o f a p ious , yet 
ineffectual, leftism; we risk parenting a 
disarmament movement with vision 
but little long-term support.
Let the debate begin in earnest.
An early antibase demonstration 
at Omega. Eastern Gippsland.
Philip Hind la a disarmament 
activist who has worked In a full-time 
capacity for the peace movement.
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